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It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person’s thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties; instead, mental content is individuated in part on the basis of the thinker’s environment. I will call this view content externalism. Many content externalists have accepted the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I will call this view concept-possession externalism.  Typically, it is claimed that if k is a concept of a certain sort (for example, an atomic natural kind concept, or the concept water), then a person can possess k only if she has interacted with instances of k.​[2]​
I propose to accept Burge’s [1982] influential interpretation of Twin-Earth-style thought experiments. It is a consequence of this interpretation that content externalism is true. I will then consider several variations of concept-possession externalism, and will argue for the following two claims: (1) Concept-possession externalism does not follow from Twin-Earth-style thought experiments; nor does it follow from Kripke/Putnam style causal views of reference.​[3]​   In fact, the most plausible variations of concept-possession externalism do not even account for our intuitions in typical Twin-Earth cases.  It is therefore possible to accept content externalism while denying concept-possession externalism.  (2) Concept-possession externalism is false. There are no concepts that can be possessed only by thinkers with a particular causal history.
Although content externalism has received more attention in the literature, concept-possession externalism is an important thesis in the following respect. The formulation of content externalism that I have given is quite vague. The significance of content externalists’ claims about individuation depends on which mental contents are at issue, which extrinsic properties are relevant to their individuation, and what role these properties play. (For example, it is widely held that mental contents that involve demonstratives are individuated in part on the basis of their referents. But this view has few of the consequences associated with (e.g.) Burge’s externalism [Burge 1982].)  Externalists such as McGinn [1989] have therefore taken the provision of precise existence and identity conditions for mental contents to be among their most central tasks.  McGinn attempts to accomplish this task by defending a version of concept-possession externalism, which he calls strong externalism.  But if I am right, McGinn’s approach fails.  Extrinsic properties play some role in the individuation of mental states, but it may be that this role is more complex than concept-possession externalists assume.
Concept-possession externalism is of further interest because of the role it plays in attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access. A typical example of such an attempt runs as follows:​[4]​
1. Privileged Access: I can know a priori that I possess the concept water (because I can know a priori that I am thinking that water is wet).
2. Concept-Possession Externalism: I can know a priori that a person can possess the concept water only if she has causally interacted with water.
3. Therefore, I can know a priori that I have causally interacted with water.
4. But I cannot know a priori that I have causally interacted with water.
5. Therefore, either Privileged Access or Concept-Possession Externalism
must be rejected.​[5]​ [McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995; Boghossian 1998]
If my claims are correct, then such arguments should not worry the content externalist. The content externalist should simply deny (2). The content externalist can allow that concept-possession externalism is incompatible with privileged access, since concept-possession externalism is neither entailed by content externalism nor supported by Twin-Earth thought experiments, and since concept-possession externalism can be shown to be false on other grounds.
I will begin my case against concept-possession externalism with a brief review of Putnam’s original Twin-Earth thought experiment. Although this thought experiment will be familiar to most readers, it will be worthwhile to re-examine what support it provides for concept-possession externalism.

1 Twin-Earth
Putnam [1996] invites us to imagine that somewhere in a distant part of the galaxy there is a planet that duplicates Earth in almost every detail. Although the inhabitants of this planet who speak the language they call ‘English’ call this planet ‘Earth’, we may call it ‘Twin-Earth’. Twin-Earth looks very much like Earth; many inhabitants of Earth even have atom-for-atom duplicates on Twin-Earth who share their experiential histories down to the smallest detail. There is one key physical difference between Earth and Twin-Earth: on Twin-Earth, there is no H2O. The substance that fills rivers and lakes, comes out of taps, rains from the sky, and is called ‘water’ by speakers of Twin-English is an entirely different chemical, which we may call ‘XYZ’.  (We are meant to ignore the inessential fact that the human body largely consists of H2O.)  XYZ looks, smells, tastes, and quenches thirst just like H2O; in fact, XYZ and H2O are indistinguishable to anyone who lacks an advanced knowledge of chemistry. In spite of the superficial similarity of H2O and XYZ, it seems intuitively correct to say that there is no water on Twin-Earth. There is no non-scientific English word that refers to XYZ, so we will introduce the word ‘twater’ to translate the Twin-English word ‘water’.
Burge [1982] completes the thought-experiment as follows. We are to imagine that although scientists on Earth know that water is H2O and scientists on Twin-Earth know that twater is XYZ, there are many uneducated people on each planet who do not share this knowledge. Suppose that Oscar is one of these uneducated Earthlings, while Twin-Oscar is his physical and experiential duplicate on Twin-Earth. Suppose further that Oscar and Twin-Oscar each express a belief by sincerely uttering the sounds, ‘Water is wet.’ Do Oscar and Twin-Oscar express the same belief?  Intuitively, they do not. Oscar believes that water is wet, while Twin-Oscar believes that twater is wet (where these belief attributions are read de dicto). Oscar’s belief involves the concept water while Twin-Oscar’s belief involves the concept twater. Indeed, it seems that Twin-Oscar would not possess the concept water. After all, how could he have come to possess this concept? No one on Twin-Earth has interacted with water; we may assume in this case that no one on Twin-Earth has so much as conceived of H2O. Likewise, it is intuitive to say that in this case Oscar does not possess the concept twater.
Clearly, similar thought experiments can be constructed for a wide variety of concepts, in particular for concepts that refer to natural kinds. Burge concludes that the physical difference between Earth and Twin-Earth affects the mental contents of their inhabitants. The mental contents of physical duplicates, and the concepts they possess, can vary as a result of differences in their environments. Thus the content of a person’s thoughts fails to supervene on her intrinsic characteristics. Thus content externalism is true.

2 Concept-Possession Externalism
It is worth noting that this thought experiment does not show that the people of Twin-Earth could not possess the concept water. That is, it does not show that concept-possession externalism is true with respect to the concept water. (A similar point is made by Bilgrami [1996: 362-363].) So far, we are only entitled to draw the weaker conclusion that in one case the inhabitants of Twin-Earth do not possess this concept. Indeed, it seems impossible for thought experiments of this type to establish the stronger conclusion definitively, since the result of each thought experiment can only show that in a particular case the concept is not possessed. At best, consideration of a variety of cases might produce an inductive argument for concept-possession externalism. Prima facie, however, it may seem difficult to conceive of a case in which a person possesses a concept that refers to a natural kind without having interacted with instances of the natural kind.  On these grounds, several philosophers have wished to explain our intuition that Twin-Oscar does not possess the concept water by suggesting that the following is a metaphysically necessary fact about concept possession:
(C) If the concept k is a natural kind concept, then one possesses k only if one has causally interacted with instances of k.​[6]​
Externalists who endorse concept-possession externalism usually hold that k is a natural kind concept only if k actually refers to a natural kind.​[7]​  Thus unicorn and phlogiston are not natural kind concepts.  Although defining natural kind concept in this way eliminates some obvious counterexamples, (C) is highly problematic. Colin McGinn offers the following argument against (C) [1989: 25; see also Burge [1982]; McLaughlin and Tye 1998a: 296; 1998b: 369]. Imagine a world in which oxygen and hydrogen exist, but are rare and widely separated so that they never combine into H2O.  (Following Boghossian
[1998], we may call this planet ‘Dry-Earth’.) Chemists on Dry-Earth who possess the concepts oxygen and hydrogen and understand chemical bonding might theorize that hydrogen and oxygen can combine into H2O. They might thus come to possess the natural kind concept H2O even if they have never causally interacted with H2O. (We may assume that H2O exists in some other part of the universe, so that H2O is a natural kind concept.) According to (C), this is impossible; therefore (C) should be rejected.
McGinn argues that this counterexample is possible because the concept H2O is molecular: it is made up of the concepts hydrogen, two, and oxygen.  He thus proposes that concept-possession externalism is true only of atomic natural kind concepts. (A concept is atomic if and only if it is not made up of other concepts.) So, we may replace (C) with (M):
(M) If the concept k is an atomic natural kind concept, then one possesses it only if one has causally interacted with instances of k [McGinn 1989: 30-36, 47-48].
Brian McLaughlin and Michael Tye [1998a: 300-302] argue that (M) is too strong using a thought experiment from Burge [1982]. Burge imagines a Dry- Earth on which the inhabitants are under the illusion that there is a liquid with the phenomenal properties of water. They believe that this liquid flows from taps, fills rivers, rains from the sky, and so forth. Chemists on this planet theorize that this illusory liquid is H2O. (As in the previous example, suppose that they are able to gain the concepts hydrogen and oxygen through interaction with these elements, and that although H2O exists elsewhere in the universe, on Dry-Earth hydrogen and oxygen are so rare and widely separated that they have never combined into H2O.)  Burge argues that it is intuitive to say that the inhabitants of this planet possess the concept water.
The proponent of (M) might claim that the Dry-Earthlings’ concept is not atomic. Although the notion of an atomic concept is difficult, I see no reason to suppose that this claim is correct. After all, the word that expresses this concept could be syntactically atomic. Further, there is no evidence that the Dry-Earthlings’ concept is equivalent to a molecular concept. (It is certainly not equivalent to the concept H2O. On Dry-Earth as on Earth, the identity of water and H2O is an a posteriori theory; one need not possess the concept H2O to possess the concept water.) McLaughlin and Tye argue that, ‘The notion of an atomic concept makes clearest sense on a language of thought view.’ On this view, ‘a concept is a mentalese symbol that a thinker is disposed to use in certain ways in thoughts. The concept is atomic if and only if the relevant mentalese word is syntactically atomic.’ [1998a: 300-301]  There is no reason to suppose that the Dry-Earthlings’ concept is not atomic in this sense.
McLaughlin and Tye conclude that (M) is unsatisfactory, and propose in its stead the following:
(M+) If the concept k is an atomic natural kind concept, then one cannot possess it unless one has either causally interacted with instances of k or one has causally interacted with instances of the kinds that make up the kind k [1998a: 301].
(M+) is immune to the Dry-Earth counterexamples, since although the concept water is an atomic natural kind concept, the inhabitants of Dry-Earth have causally interacted with the kinds that make up water (hydrogen and oxygen). Nonetheless, as it stands, (M+) is problematic. Suppose that scientists on Dry-Earth theorize that water could combine with another chemical to form a new substance (say, mirabilite (sodium sulphate decahydrate)). According to (M+), the scientists could possess the concept water, since they have interacted with the natural kinds that make up water (hydrogen and oxygen), but they could not possess the concept mirabilite, since they have not interacted with water, which is one of the natural kinds that make up mirabilite. But this is implausible.
Fortunately, (M+) requires only a trivial modification to avoid this worry: 
(M+2) If the concept k is an atomic natural kind concept, then one cannot possess it unless one has either causally interacted with instances of k or one has causally interacted with instances of the kinds that make up the kind k, or the kinds that make up these kinds, or the kinds that make up these kinds, and so forth.
It is worth noting that (M+) is extremely weak, and (M+2) is even weaker. In fact, neither explains our intuitions (that Oscar does not possess the concept twater and Twin-Oscar does not possess the concept water) in the original Twin-Earth thought experiment.  There is nothing in the original Twin-Earth thought experiment to suggest that Oscar has never interacted with the constituents of XYZ; XYZ could even be a chemical compound that consists of ordinary Earth elements. Therefore, neither (M+) nor (M+2) gives us any reason to think that Oscar cannot possess the concept twater. Similarly, we have not assumed that Twin-Oscar has no causal contact with hydrogen and oxygen; certainly he has at least had causal contact with the subatomic particles that make up these elements. So, neither (M+) nor (M+2) gives us any reason to think that Twin-Oscar cannot possess the concept water.
Of course, this does not show that (M+2) is false. I will postpone my attempt to show that (M+2) is false until section 4.  First, I want to consider one alternative approach to the Dry-Earth examples. Several authors have attributed the following thesis to Burge [1982]:
(Q) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of a natural kind k and x is agnostic about the application conditions of the concept of k, then either x is in an environment which contains k, or x is part of a community with the concept k [Brown 1998: 189; McLaughlin and Tye 1998a: 314].
The notion of being agnostic about the application conditions of a concept is not entirely clear. (After all, every possessor of a concept k must know that k applies to all and only k things; it is not clear that any other knowledge is in general required.)  Jessica Brown, who was among the first to argue that Burge is committed to (Q), intends her use of ‘being agnostic about the application conditions of a natural kind concept’ to be understood in the following way: a possessor of a natural kind concept k is agnostic about the application conditions of k if she has no view about what the necessary and sufficient chemical conditions for being k are [1998: 188]. For example, a possessor of the concept water is agnostic about the application conditions of water if she has no belief about the chemical composition of water.
Given Brown’s usage, (Q) avoids the sort of problem that Dry-Earth poses for (M) in the following way. Suppose that x is an inhabitant of Dry-Earth who has never causally interacted with water, and suppose that no other member of x’s community possesses the concept water. How could x come to possess this concept? If x theorizes that the concept water applies to H2O, then she is not agnostic about the application conditions of water, so (Q) does not apply. Assuming that x is agnostic about the application conditions of her concept, what reason do we have to suppose that she possesses the concept water rather than the concept twater or some other concept?
Thus Dry-Earth does not produce an obvious counterexample to (Q). I conclude that (Q) and (M+2) are the most plausible versions of concept-possession externalism, and will focus my attack upon them. Notice, however, that (M+2) is entailed by (C), (M), and (M+). Any counterexample to (M+2) is therefore a counterexample to the stronger theories as well.

3 Causal Theories of Reference
I argued above that the Twin-Earth thought experiment does not entail any form of concept-possession externalism. At best, the thought experiment provides inductive evidence for concept-possession externalism. It might be thought, however, that Twin-Earth produces an indirect argument for concept-possession externalism. The argument I have in mind would run as follows:
1. As Putnam [1996] argued, Twin-Earth suggests that a Kripke-style causal theory of reference is true for atomic natural kind concepts.
2. If a causal theory of reference is true for atomic natural kind concepts, then in order to possess the atomic natural kind concept k, a person must have causally interacted with instances of k (or at least with the natural kinds that make up k, or the natural kinds that make up these natural kinds, etc.).
3. Therefore, (M) (or (M+2)) is true.
In this section and the next, I will try to show that (2) is false. In fact, no plausible causal theory of reference entails concept-possession externalism. I will begin with a brief discussion of Kripke’s [1980] picture of the way that natural kind terms refer.
On Kripke’s view, natural kind terms are prototypically introduced by an initial baptism. In this initial baptism, the reference of the term can be fixed by ostension or description. Later, the reference of the term is determined by causal links to the baptism. Kripke imagines the natural kind gold being baptized in the following way: ‘Gold is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or at any rate, by almost all of them,’ [1980: 135] where the items over there are (at least mostly) samples of gold. Later uses of the word ‘gold’ refer to gold because they are distantly causally connected to this initial baptism: the word has been passed down from speaker to speaker in a chain that has come to include current users.
Kripke argues that the semantic value of a term introduced in this way is not identical to the semantic value of the definite description that fixes its reference because the two behave differently in modal contexts [1980: 54-58].  ‘Gold’ is a rigid designator: it refers to gold in all possible worlds. ‘The substance instantiated by the items over there’ is not a rigid designator: it refers to different substances in different worlds. So, although the sentence, ‘Necessarily, gold is gold’ is true, ‘Necessarily, the substance instantiated by the items over there is gold’ has a reading on which it is false. Since ‘gold’ and ‘the substance instantiated by the items over there’ are not intersubstitutable salva veritate, they cannot have the same semantic value.​[8]​
Further, the reference of a term can be fixed with a Donnellan-style referential use of a definite description [Donnellan 1966]. A speaker uses a definite description referentially when she uses it to enable her audience to pick out the person or thing she is talking about. As Donnellan points out, she might accomplish this even if nothing fits the description used. So, suppose that I introduce the term ‘gold’ by saying, ‘Gold is the substance instantiated by the bits of yellow metal over there.’ Suppose, however, that I am deceived by unusual lighting and that the bits of metal are not in fact yellow. If my listeners are also deceived, or if they realize that I am, I would succeed in fixing the reference of ‘gold’ by enabling them to pick out the things I am talking about, even though the description I use fails to denote. It is highly counterintuitive to suppose that in such a case ‘gold’ would have the same semantic value as a description that denotes nothing.

4 Why Concept-Possession Externalism Is False
Putnam’s account of natural kind concepts,​[9]​ developed partially on the basis of Twin-Earth examples, is quite similar; indeed, Putnam explicitly endorses Kripke’s view [1996: 19].​[10]​   But it is a consequence of this account that concept-possession externalism is false.  For according to this account we can use a definite description to fix the reference of a natural kind concept. But we can use definite descriptions to refer to objects with which we have never causally interacted (for example, ‘the first baby to be born next century’). So we can introduce a natural kind concept that refers to a kind with which we have never interacted. The causal chain that fixes the reference for later users must go back to the baptismal event; but since the baptism can take place by definite description, the causal chain need not go back to the referent itself.
It might seem that we now have immediate counterexamples to (Q) and (M+2). For example, suppose I introduce the natural kind concept julius, fixing the reference with the definite description, ‘the first natural kind to be synthesized by scientists next year’. But the matter is not so simple. Kim Sterelny, in his development of Putnam’s theory of natural kind terms, argues that in addition to being linked by a causal chain to a baptismal event, a user of a natural kind term must have some knowledge of the causal powers of the kind, as well as some ability to recognize the kind [1996: 104-106]. These conditions are clearly not met for julius.  McLaughlin and Tye propose a version of concept-possession externalism that integrates a similar restriction. (I modify their proposal to incorporate the conclusion reached on the basis of my mirabilite thought experiment, above):
(M+3) If the concept k is a recognitional or nondescriptive name atomic natural kind concept, then one possesses it only if one has interacted with instances of k, or with instances of the natural kinds that make up k, or with instances of the natural kinds that make up these natural kinds, etc. [1998b: 21 n. 26].
(M+3) is entailed by (M+2), so any counterexample to (M+3) is also a counterexample to (M+2) (and thus, a counterexample to (C), (M), and (M+)). Although julius is not a counterexample to (M+3), I believe that our ability to fix a reference with a definite description can provide counterexamples.  For example, imagine that in a distant part of the universe, causally isolated from Earth, there is a planet called ‘Unearth’ on which the laws of physics are very different. On this planet, matter is not made of molecules. There are no protons, neutrons, or electrons, nor are there smaller subatomic particles or even energy as we know it. In fact, this planet has no natural kinds in common with Earth. There is, however, a substance that looks, smells, and tastes very much like water. We may call this substance ‘unwater’. The inhabitants of Unearth are relatively scientifically ignorant: they have no knowledge of chemistry or physics. They do, however, have a well-developed astronomy that includes a coordinate system with which they can pick out the location of other stars and planets. Now suppose that an inhabitant of Unearth fixes the reference of the term ‘schmwater’ with the following definite description: ‘the substance that has the phenomenal properties of unwater on the planet at < X, Y, Z >’, where Earth is the planet at < X, Y, Z >. Naturally, this situation is fantastically unlikely, especially since the inhabitants of Unearth would have no way of knowing that there is a planet at < X, Y, Z >, much less that there is a watery substance on this planet. We may imagine that the inhabitants of Unearth take themselves to have good reasons for thinking that there is such a substance; for example, perhaps the existence of schmwater is an important component of their religious beliefs. Believers contemplate and discuss schmwater frequently, and possess various amounts of information about schmwater: perhaps some know the phenomenal properties of schmwater but not its location, while others know both.
It seems to me plausible that ‘schmwater’ would express the concept water. ‘Schmwater’ must express some determinate concept, since we would count many of the beliefs that Unearthlings express with the word ‘schmwater’ as true or false. Indeed, if we Earthlings travelled to Unearth, we would be likely to translate ‘schmwater’ with our word ‘water’; similarly, Unearthlings would be likely to translate our word ‘water’ as ‘schmwater’. Schmwater shares its referent with water, and the two play extremely similar roles in the cognitive economies of their users. (Of course, the sort of religious beliefs that I have described are not generally associated with water, but this is clearly inessential to the identity of the concept.) I see no promising grounds for denying the identity of the two concepts.
It might be objected that a world that lacks the basic subatomic natural kinds that make up natural kinds on Earth is inconceivable, or metaphysically impossible. If this is the case, then (M+2) and (M+3) are completely vacuous: if every possible world shares all of the basic components of all natural kinds with Earth, then (M+2) and (M+3) give us no reason to suppose that there are any concepts that can be acquired only by thinkers with a particular causal history.​[11]​
Even if the concept schmwater is not the same as our concept water, I think that the situation described in this thought experiment is a counterexample to (M+3). The proponent of (M+3) would have to make one of the following claims: (1) Schmwater is not a natural kind concept. (2) Schmwater is not an atomic concept. (3) Schmwater is not a recognitional concept. (4) Schmwater is not a nondescriptive name concept. None of these claims would be plausible. I see no grounds for (1). A natural kind concept must refer to a natural kind; schmwater meets this requirement, since schmwater refers to the natural kind H2O. Even if we adopt Sterelny’s restrictions, a possessor of the concept schmwater would have some knowledge of the causal effects of schmwater, because she would know its phenomenal properties. I will show that a possessor of schmwater would satisfy Sterelny’s recognitional ability requirement in my discussion of (3) below.
(2) is also false. The mere fact that a concept has its reference fixed by a definite description does not make it molecular. After all, concepts like water and gold that are uncontroversially atomic could have their reference fixed in this way. Possessors of the concept schmwater need not know the description that fixed the reference, as I will show in my discussion of (4) below.  Further, there is no reason to suppose that on a language of thought view, the mentalese word ‘schmwater’ would not be syntactically atomic.
The interpretation of (3) depends on what is meant by ‘recognitional concept’. On the strongest interpretation that is possible in this context, a concept k is recognitional if and only if a possessor of k can reliably recognize instances of k under normal circumstances. (On any stronger reading, for example if the concept k’s being recognitional was taken to imply that a possessor of k could infallibly recognize instances of k, no natural kind concept would be recognitional, and thus (M+3) would be vacuous.) On this interpretation, the concept schmwater is recognitional: under normal circumstances a possessor of the concept schmwater can reliably recognize schmwater. It is true that possessors of the concept schmwater are not in general able to distinguish between twater and schmwater, nor are they able to recognize schmwater reliably when they do not know what planet they are on. But this does not mean that schmwater is not a recognitional concept; after all, most possessors of water can neither distinguish between twater and water, nor recognize water reliably when they do not know what planet they are on. Under normal circumstances, however, there is no issue of distinguishing between the two, and under normal circumstances we know what planet we are on. So (3) is false.
An alternative account of recognitional concepts has been developed by
Brian Loar [1990; 1997]. On Loar’s view, the reference of a recognitional concept is determined by the user’s dispositions to apply it to perceived samples. The reference of such a concept could not be fixed by a description.  It is by no means clear to me that such concepts exist.  But in any case, Loar’s recognitional concepts provide little aid to the concept-possession externalist.  There is no reason that an inhabitant of Unearth could not have a concept that she is disposed to apply only to the watery stuff in a particular region of the universe, even if this disposition has never been exercised. (Similarly, Loar notes that one could have a recognitional concept of the missing shade of blue [1990: 126].) So (3) is false even on Loar’s view.
Finally, on any plausible interpretation of ‘nondescriptive name concept’, (4) is false. ‘Nondescriptive name concept’ cannot mean ‘concept whose reference cannot be fixed by a definite description’. If it meant this, it seems very likely that there would be no nondescriptive name natural kind concepts, and thus that (M+3) would be vacuous. According to Gareth Evans, ‘In the case of descriptive names there is a public, semantical connection between the name and the description [...] Anyone who understands the name must be aware of the reference-fixing role of the description.’ [1982: 48] On Evans’s view, then, the possessors of a descriptive name concept must meet two conditions: (i) they must know the description that fixes the concept’s reference, and (ii) they must know the fact that that description fixes its reference. Possessors of schmwater could fail to meet either condition. For example, some possessors of the concept schmwater might fail to satisfy (i) because they falsely believe that the reference of schmwater was fixed by a description which included only some of the phenomenal properties of unwater, such as ‘the clear, thirst-quenching liquid at < X, Y, Z >’. Such a person would still be able to recognize schmwater. Indeed, a possessor of schmwater might know considerably less than this if she is prepared to defer to her more knowledgeable peers. For example, we might imagine a possessor of schmwater who does not know that schmwater is on the planet at < X, Y, Z > and relies on her peers to tell her when she is on the schmwatery planet. The recognitional abilities of such a possessor would depend in part on her peers, but most content externalists will not see this as problematic. (The ubiquity of such cases was emphasized by Putnam [1996].)
Possessors of schmwater might not even believe that its reference was fixed by a description; perhaps some believe (falsely) that their ancestors interacted with schmwater long ago, and that their beliefs about the location and phenomenal properties of schmwater simply reflect their ancestors’ empirical discoveries. Such possessors would fail to satisfy condition (ii), but again, this would not prevent them from reliably recognizing schmwater.
Moreover, it seems that schmwater could refer to water even if water did not quite satisfy the description that fixed the reference of schmwater.  For example, we might imagine that water and unwater are phenomenally extremely similar but are distinguishable under certain unusual lighting conditions.  Then water would not have the phenomenal properties of unwater.  Nonetheless, it is plausible that schmwater would refer to water. (Recall that reference-fixing definite descriptions can be used referentially.) In this case, schmwater would not even be coextensive with the description that fixes its reference.
I conclude that schmwater is a nondescriptive name concept. So (4) is false.
Thus (M+3) fails: it is either vacuous or false. What about (Q)? The introducer of schmwater does not know the chemical composition of schmwater, so on Brown’s understanding, the introducer of schmwater is agnostic about the application conditions of schmwater. Yet there is no schmwater in her environment, and no other member of her community needs to possess the concept schmwater. So on Brown’s understanding, (Q) is false.
It may seem, however, that Brown’s interpretation is too narrow. Perhaps one can be agnostic about the application conditions of a concept only if one knows no definite description that picks out the referent of the concept. If this is the case, then the scope of (Q) is extremely small. There are probably no concepts about whose application conditions I am agnostic in this sense. For I always have available metalinguistic definite descriptions (‘the substance my linguistic community refers to as “water”’) and I usually have available ostensive descriptions (‘the substance of which that is composed’).  Clearly, Burge intended his view to apply to a much larger class of concepts than this interpretation would allow.
On one plausible interpretation, Burge’s externalism applies to deferential concepts. A concept (token) is deferential if and only if its user is willing to defer to experts about its application conditions. Suppose that we gloss ‘p is agnostic about the application conditions of c’ as ‘c is a deferential concept for p’. Then the typical possessor of schmwater is agnostic about its application conditions, because schmwater is a deferential concept. For example, if a typical possessor of schmwater encountered a scientist from Earth (or someone she took to be a scientist from Earth), she would defer to this person.
I conclude that insofar as the meaning of being agnostic about the application conditions of a concept is clear, (Q) is false.

5 The Causal Theory of Reference Revisited
A proponent of the causal theory of reference might object that although this line of argument shows that (Q) and (M+3) are false, it does not show that a more limited concept-possession externalism is false.  My counterexample to (Q) and (M+3) relies on a definite description to fix the reference of a concept. But, the proponent of the causal theory of reference might claim that no definite description could be used to fix a reference in this way by a speaker who had no history of causal interaction with things in the world (e.g., a mind under the influence of a Cartesian demon, or a brain in a vat). Without such causal interaction, the causal theorist might argue, the words of the definite description could not pick out objects in the world and thus could not fix the reference of a natural kind concept. Michael Devitt advances essentially this argument against description theorists; his argument also applies to theories that allow reference-fixing by description:
A description theory explains the referential properties of one category of term by appeal to those of other categories. This cannot be the whole story. To complete the story, we need an explanation of the referential properties of those other categories.  Perhaps description theories can be used again. But this process cannot go on forever: There must be some basic terms whose referential properties are not parasitic on others. Otherwise, language as a whole is cut loose from the world. [1990: 82; see also McGinn 1989: 35-36]
On this basis, the causal theorist might advance a principle like the following:
(W) If the concept k is a natural kind concept, then one possesses k only if one has causally interacted with some object in the world.
I am sympathetic to this line of thought. Note, however, that the restriction it places on concept possession is exceedingly weak. Everyone except victims of bizarre sceptical scenarios could possess any natural kind concept. More importantly, however, (W) does not follow from Devitt’s argument. Presumably a brain in a vat would have phenomenal concepts (e.g., red), as well as any concepts that could be gained a priori. It seems to me that such concepts are in principle sufficient to fix the reference of a natural kind concept. (Of course, a brain in a vat in an otherwise empty world could have few natural kind concepts, since natural kind concepts exist only if natural kinds exist.) This is particularly plausible if we agree with Kant that concepts like space, time, substance, and cause are a priori. Thus I am not convinced that the causal theory of reference puts any restriction at all on concept possession; if it does, the restriction is very weak.

6 Recap of Argument and Conclusion
Suppose that we accept the following (hopefully untendentious) sufficient condition for concept identity:​[12]​
If a thinker p1 possesses a concept c1, and a thinker p2 possess a concept c2, c1 is (type-) identical to c2 if:
1. the referent of c1 is identical to the referent of c2, and
2. c1 and c2 play identical cognitive roles.
Then my argument against concept-possession externalism runs as follows.  Suppose c1 is a concept (for example, a recognitional, non-descriptive name, atomic natural kind concept) possessed by a person (p1) who has causally interacted with instances of c1, and c2 is possessed by a person (p2) who has not causally interacted with instances of c2 or the natural kinds that make up c2. We may even assume that there is no natural kind with which both p1 and p2 have causally interacted. I claim that c2 can be (type-) identical to c1. Suppose that the referent of c2 is fixed by a definite description so that c2=c1. Then (1) is satisfied. Although it is difficult to make the notion of cognitive role precise, I see no reason that (2) cannot be satisfied as well. After all, the concept twater plays the same cognitive role as the concept water, even though they involve different causal interactions.​[13]​  There is little reason to think that a concept whose reference is fixed in a way that involves causal interaction could not play the same cognitive role as a concept whose reference is fixed with a definite description, especially if we consider later users of the concept whose relation to the original baptism may be quite distant.
If this line of argument is correct, concept-possession externalism could apply only to concepts whose reference could not be fixed by a definite description.  I doubt that there are any such concepts.​[14]​  I admit, however, that I know of no way to prove this. Certainly, no example of such a concept has been produced: in particular, atomic natural kind concepts such as water and aluminium are not examples. Even if there are such concepts, the scope of concept-possession externalism is far more limited than many of its proponents have supposed.
To recap: I have tried to show that concept-possession externalism is entailed neither by content externalism, nor by the most plausible interpretation of the Twin-Earth thought experiments that are used to argue for content externalism. If this is correct, then arguments that attempt to show that concept-possession externalism is incompatible with privileged access should not worry the content externalist: the truth of content externalism is independent of concept-possession externalism. I then argued that there are counterexamples to strong versions of concept-possession externalism. I next tried to show that causal theories of reference do not support concept-possession externalism. In fact, since causal theories allow reference to be fixed by a description, it is a consequence of these theories that even weak versions of concept-possession externalism are false. At most, causal theories show that in order to possess natural kind terms, a person must have some causal interaction with something in the world, but I suggested that the evidence for even this weak claim is unconvincing. Finally, I argued that concept-possession externalism could apply only to concepts whose referents cannot be fixed by definite descriptions. I doubt that there are any such concepts.  The burden is now on the proponent of concept-possession externalism to assuage my doubt.
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^1	  I thank Michael Tye, Mark Sainsbury, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on previous drafts.
^2	  Some examples: Putnam [1999] advances this doctrine for an unspecified but seemingly large class of terms; Sawyer [1998: 529-530] and Nuccetelli [2003a: 172] for natural kind concepts; and McGinn [1989: 30-36, 47-48] for atomic natural kind concepts. Some philosophers have proposed weakened versions of concept-possession externalism to account for cases in which a person possesses a concept on the basis of a scientific theory; for example, [Burge 1982; McLaughlin and Tye 1998a: 301, 313; 1998b: 368 n. 26]. I discuss these variations in detail below.
^3	 It does, however, follow from Putnam’s more recent views (e.g., [Putnam 1999]).
^4	 Other arguments have been advanced both for and against the claim that externalism is incompatible with privileged access. I cannot hope to address them all here. For a more thorough overview, see [McLaughlin and Tye 1998a; 1998b] and the papers collected in [Ludlow and Martin 1998; Nuccetelli 2003b]. 
^5	  Some externalists have denied (4) and accepted (1) - (3) as a refutation of skepticism [Putnam 1999; Sawyer 1998; Warfield 1998].
^6	  Sawyer [1998: 530] and Nuccetelli [2003a: 172] apparently endorse (C); they may, however, intend their theories to apply only to atomic concepts, and thus endorse (M), below.
^7	  It is worth noting that this terminology produces a trivial necessary condition for the possession of natural kind concepts:(E) If the concept k is a natural kind concept, then one cannot possess k unless k exists.
^8	  This reasoning is contested by Evans [1982: §§2.3, 2.5]. I address Evans’s view insection 4, below.
^9	  Putnam developed his account for natural kind terms; I take for granted the extension to concepts developed by McGinn [1977], Burge [1998; 1982], and others.
^10	  Following Burge [1982], I reject Putnam’s doctrine that natural kind concepts are indexicals. If this is taken to be an essential component of Putnam’s theory of reference for natural kind concepts, the view I consider here should not be attributed to him.
^11	  I have described Unearth as lacking all of the basic components of Earth’s natural kinds. But a similar counterexample to (M+2) and (M+3) can be generated as long as Unearth lacks at least one basic component.
^12	  McGinn [1982] argues for the stronger claim that it is also a necessary condition.
^13	  This is true even if we individuate cognitive roles widely. Cognitive roles are specified using counterfactuals, and the same counterfactuals are true of my water concept and my twin’s twater concept [Fodor 1987: ch. 2].
^14	  As I point out above, Loar-style recognitional concepts may be an exception; but concept-possession externalism is false for these concepts in any case.
